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In the 1960s and early 1970s, Keynesian economics
was the dominant macroeconomic policy paradigm. Mone-
tary policy was widely thought to have only a minor
impact on the real economy or inflation. Fiscal policy—
which many thought to be important both for stabilizing
the real economy and for controlling inflation—reigned
supreme. The objective of macroeconomic policy was to
choose a preferred combination of inflation and unemploy-
ment rates along a stable long-run Phillips curve.
Several empirical studies in the 1960s challenged this
reigning orthodoxy. One of these, published in 1968 by
Leonall C. Andersen and Jerry L. Jordan in this Bank’s
Review, showed that changes in money have larger and
more predictable effects on nominal gross national product
than do changes in government spending. Evidence sug-
gesting that monetary policy was relatively more effective
than fiscal policy gave birth to a long-running debate about
the relative importance of monetary versus fiscal policy
that has never been settled. The debate was preempted
when the U.S. government began running large and
persistent fiscal deficits in the early 1970s. Advocacy of
counter-cyclical fiscal policy largely died, not because
Keynesians conceded that fiscal policy was relatively
ineffective, but because counter-cyclical fiscal policy was
not viewed as an option in an environment of large and
persistent deficits.
The experience of Japan during the last decade provides
more recent evidence about the importance of fiscal policy.
After decades of strong economic growth and only one
relatively mild recession (in 1974), the Japanese economy
has been in a period of sluggish growth since the early
1990s. From 1991 to 2000, Japan’s GDP grew at a com-
pound average annual rate of 1.2 percent—3.0 percentage
points below the rate of the previous decade.
The Japanese government shunned monetary policy,
as the growth of M2+CDs (a broad monetary aggregate)
declined from an average rate of 9.9 percent in 1975-1990
to just 2.6 percent in 1991-2000. Instead, to stimulate the
economy, the Japanese government followed a Keynesian
fiscal-policy prescription and in 1992 began implement-
ing a series of unprecedented tax cuts and expenditure
increases. General government outlays rose from 30.9
percent of GDP in 1991 to 38.1 percent of GDP in 1999,
while general government tax and non-tax receipts declined
from 33.8 percent of GDP to 31.1 percent. Not surprisingly,
the government budget went from a surplus of 2.9 percent
of GDP in 1991 to a deficit of 7 percent of GDP in 1999.
(In contrast, the largest general [federal, state, and local]
government deficit in the U.S. in the deficit-ridden 1980s
was 5.3 percent of GDP in 1986). Because of its repeated
efforts to stimulate the economy through fiscal policy,
Japan now faces a serious debt problem (Japan’s debt-to-
GDP ratio has nearly doubled in the last decade, rising
from 0.58 in 1991 to 1.1 in 2000).1
Many of the reasons advanced for the apparent failure of
the fiscal policy measures to stimulate the Japanese econ-
omy sound familiar: some of the measures were viewed
as temporary and, consequently, had little impact on aggre-
gate demand; the actual fiscal policy measures were not
large enough—more aggressive action would have been
successful; the actions were smaller than originally
announced; the wrong set of expenditure programs were
introduced—other programs would have been successful.
Any or all of these criticisms may be valid, but they imply
that implementing a successful fiscal policy is difficult.
Hence, either the implication is true—fiscal policy is rela-
tively ineffective—or implementing a successful fiscal
policy is difficult. Either way, the Japanese fiscal policy
experiment suggests that the practical usefulness of fiscal
policy may be limited.
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1See Christopher J. Neely, “How Big is Japan’s Debt?” International Economic
Trends, February 1999.